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PREFACE 
This paper has been produced as part of IIASA's hazardous waste manage- 
ment work, which is the main component of the lnstitutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies project. The overall aim of this work, reflected in this 
paper, is to systematize our understanding of interactions between institu- 
tional and technical factors in policy making and implementation. The 
influence of institutional processes upon technical knowledge built into policy 
has been increasingly recognized. However, it has yet to be adequately clarified 
in comparative research on different regulatory systems. lnstitutional struc- 
tures canot be easily transplanted from one culture to mother. Nevertheless, 
through the normal flux of policy, institutional development slowly occurs any- 
way, in more or less ad hoc fashion. Comparative insight may help to &rect 
reflection and adaptation in more deliberate and constructive ways. 
This paper forms one draft chapter of an intended book on hazardous waste 
management. The reader will therefore notice references to other draft 
chapters in this study which are also being circulated separately, and which are 
available from llASk A full list is given overleaf. At this stage the papers are 
drafts, and are not intended for publication in present form. They are being 
circulated for review and revision. 
I would like to thank those policy makers and others who have exchanged 
papers and information with us, and those who generously gave of their time 
and experience ir, t i e  many interviews which form a substantial input to this 
work A full list of acknowledgements will eventually be published. 
Brian Wynne 
Research Leader 
Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies 
HAZARDOUS VASE POLlCY MANAGEIIIENT 
- m O N A L  DIMENSIONS 
INTRODUCTION B. Wynne 
CHAPTER ONE Hazardous Waste - What Kind of Problem? 
B. Wynne 
CHAPTER TWO Risk Assessment of Technological Systems - dimensions of 
uncertainty 
B. Wynne 
CHAPTER THREE Risk Assessment and Regulation for Hazardous Wastes 
B. Wynne 
CHAPTER FOUR The Listrng and Classifying of Hazardous Wastes 
M. Dowling and J. Linnerooth 
CHAPTER FIVE Government Responsibility for Risk  The Bavarian and Hes- 
sianwaste Disposal System 
J. Linnerooth and G. Davis 
CHAPTER SIX Enforcement of Hazardous Waste ]Legislation in the UK 
E. Ley and B. Wynne 
CHAPTER SEVEN Summary, Implications, and F'urther Problems 
B. Wynne 
Fimther Case Sudies 
Hazardous Waste Management in Hungary - E. Kiss 
Hazardous Waste Management in the Netherlands 
Central processes in policy and implementation - J. Dirven 
Dutch policies from a local perspective - J. van Eindhoven, R. Hortensius, C. 
Nauta, C. Worrel 
CONTENTS 
Introduction 
I. Why Hazardous Waste? 
11. Why This Study? 
Previous work and the present study 
III. Science for Public Policy 
IV. Organization of Study and Outline of Chapters 
REFERENCES 
Chapter 1 
I. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NATURAL PR3BLEMS 
11. THREE STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS 
1. As an extension of conventional fields of pollution abatement, 
risk management and environmental protection. 
2. As a problem of establishing a new industrial-organizational 
infrastructure. 
3. As a problem in recycling wastes, or reducing their volumes 
and specific toxicities by changing industrial production 
techniques. 
Ill. HlSTORlCAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUE 
R'. COhfPARATIVE POLICY SYSTEMS k Y D  UNJVEXSAL TECENOLOGY - 
Significant Structural Properties of Hazardous Waste as an Issue 
1. Heterogeneity 
2. Professionalism 
3. Hazardous Waste is P a c k a g e d Waste 
4. Inverse Materials - Cash Exchange Relations 
5. Ignorance and Under-Ripeness for Risk Management 
Conclusions 
REFERENCES 
INTRODUCTlON 
Brian Wynne 
In 1979, the Dutch waste treatment company UNlSER was found to have 
been illegally disposing of large quantities of hazardous wastes and defrauding 
its customers, which included most of the Dutch chemicals industry [I]. Yet 
the only law under which the company could be prosecuted dated from the 
1850s, and was originally designed for preventing the sale of contaminated 
meat. Furthermore the credit for eventual prosecution went to local authori- 
ties, who persisted doggedly through years of evasion, lack of support and even 
informal central intervention to  suppress the issue. 
This example may be an extreme one. but i t  is not in kind unique. I t  syrn- 
bolizes the gulf evident in most countries, between: on the one hand the rapid 
growth of sophisticated international industries involving countless specific 
chemicals, complex mixtures, movements and environmental implications, and 
on the other the underdevelopment, fragility and frequent impotence of regula- 
tory institutions. Despite outbreaks of policy activity following the diversion of 
the Seveso dioxin wastes in Europe, effective international regulation especially 
lags well behind the growth in scale of the issue. Ironically, lack of implemen- 
tation of national policies in the form of controlled disposal sites, spills over 
into increased international transport and makes the lack of effective regula- 
tory frameworks and stable agreements at this level all the more costly and 
vulnerable to major disturbances. 
Regulatory bodies are increasingly required not only to perform technical 
administrative implementation of policies, but also to  perform the political 
function of reconciling conflicting perception and interests in the policy 
domain, in the justijication of policies and implementing regulations. They 
have also to manage this balancing act in an increasingly taut net  between 
international concerns about trade in hazardous wastes, and local concerns 
(e.g., facility siting opposition) which may nevertheless have international 
ramifications. In the language of operations research, the feasibility space for 
effective regulatory solutions appears to be relentlessly diminishing. 
Traditionally, two of the few resources of regulatory bodies have been the 
legislation which has given them formal powers and responsibilities, and 
scientific knowledge which has often completed gaps in formal authority with 
the  authority of science. Although in some contexts these have been supported 
by extra-institutional influences such as public opinion. other informal factors 
have acted to undermine environmental policies. To return to the Dutch case 
for example, UNISER became involved in a major scandal which led to  its disso- 
lution and the jailing of several of the company's directors, including one who 
sat  on a government expert advisory committee. UNISER was initially the only 
waste treatment operator available to the chemicals industry in the Nether- 
lands, so its demise was a severe shock t o  the system. Yet despite this major 
stimulus to create an effective infrastructure, and despite legislation, no such 
waste treatment and disposal (T and D) facilities yet exist nor are  definitely 
planned in the  Netherlands. In an apparently very different system, Hungary 
[ Z ] ,  a planned national infrastructure of three incinerators and five controlled 
landfill facilities could not be implemented. for central and local institutional 
reasons some of which a re  similar to those frustrating policy implementation 
in the Netherlands. Thus although there are differences, in both countries 
industry could not be persuaded or forced to join investment in the facilities 
nor to protect the investment once made by guaranteeing that  waste be sub- 
mitted to the facility rather than more cheaply disposed of. Both countries' 
policies have -also been undermined by successful local opposition to facility sit- 
ing. 
Different national systems have had their own experiences, but virtually 
everywhere, legislation to control hazardous waste disposal has been jerked 
hurriedly into being by rude shocks to the policy system. Whether hasty or 
"glacial" [3], movement towards the apparent step of formal legislation does not 
herald any discontinuous change in the structure of institutionalized interests 
which constrain the emergence, framing and details of such legislation. The 
same forces continue to exert themselves through the  implementation phase, 
exercising constraints, diversions, delays and transformations corresponding 
with their interests, perceptions and other commitments [4]. Thus even where 
elaborate legislation has been passed, as it  has now been in most industrialized 
countries, technical and institutional factors have combined in different but 
patterned ways to  obstruct implementation, so much so that  some authorities 
in this field fear tha t  the  public credibility and viability of regulatory systems is 
in jeopardy [ 5 ] .  "lrnplementation gap" and "enforcement deficit" have become 
standard terms in analysis of environmental policies. As we shall argue, for 
several reasons, hazardous waste regulation is qualitatively more difficult and 
complex than conventional environmental regulation. 
Modern environmental policy making, whether it be primarily about 
reshaping industrial development or about equitable risk management, is itself 
expensive and elaborate. Furthermore, it proceeds upon complex and not alto- 
gether stable foundations of public attitudes, organizational dynamics and pol- 
itical processes. These can become entangled in intensifying conflict. 
inefficiency and wastage when expectations embodied in policy goals are repeat- 
edly and even sometimes spectacularly diverted or unfulfilled. lnteractions 
between regulatory styles, institutional settings, uses of science, and public 
attitudes are central to the success or failure of policy making and implemen- 
tation. 
Hitherto, the allocation of risks and the adaptation of economic production 
through environmental policies has been treated as a problem at  the margins 
of economic policy making and technological choice. However, the scale of such 
risk and environmental impacts, their multiplication, (e.g. through organiza- 
tional ineffectiveness or public attitudes), and the scale of implied capital and 
resource movements, mean that increasingly disruptive perturbations can be 
created in economies, social systems and international trade and political 
arrangements. Policies that are unrealistic as to their implementability, and 
policy making that  does not take account of organizational realities as well as 
technical ones in evsluating options, ar.: reductionist illusions. They are not 
only economically wasteful but politically costly too [ 6 ] .  
I. Why Hazardous Waste? 
Hazardous waste is one of a family of important environmental- industrial 
issues such as acid rain, climate change, and toxic chemicals, which exhibit 
growing international ramifications. However their complex origins, and poten- 
tial solutions often lie a t  national or local levels, within formally autonomous or 
informally divergent social and economic units. For all of these issues, the  
attempt to relate technical, and economic factors to social factors a t  interna- 
tional, national and regional levels is beset with conftict and uncertainties. 
However because of certain unique properties, hazardous waste may be 
described as the black sheep issue even in this problem family. At least with 
acid rain there are some uniformities - there is pretty good agreemlent for 
example, a t  least as to what sulfur is (even if there is disagreement about its 
causal role in creating damage). There is no such agreement as to what hazar- 
dous waste is (and a l so  disagreement about its role in creating harm). Further- 
more although an essentially valueless material. it is packaged, concentrated 
and traded - i t  is passed between human agents and institutions which define it 
in different ways. Social mechanisms channel its environmental disposition 
more significantly than, say, acid rain. As described later, these and other fac- 
tors introduce extra challenges to regulation, and to policy analysis. 
New kinds of potential perturbation of policy systems and international 
arrangements are  created by some of the key structural properties of hazar- 
dous waste as an issue. In this work these properties are systematically 
analyzed for their t e c h ~ i c a l  and institutional implications. Since international 
regulation of hazardous waste is widely regarded as urgent. yet in practice is a t  
best in embryonic form, we have attempted to  return to first principles, guided 
by two convictions: 
(a) that  the field still lacks strategic definition as a policy problem-area; 
and 
(b) that  moves to establish effective in t e r na t i ona l  regulatory regimes 
should be based upon a better understanding of how characteristic 
nutional or reg ional  institutional factors influence the definition, 
meanings and uses of the (in principle) universal resource of 
scientific knowledge, and key technical terms for regulation. 
Our attempt to outline a strategic definition first distinguishes between 
fundamentally different kinds of uncertainty which are frequently confused. 
Three key insights cause us to reverse the conventional "linear" relationship 
between uncertainty, technical knowledge and regulatory relationships [6]. 
The usual model supposes that uncertainty is based on technical imprecision, 
but this is fenced in to  manageable probabilistic uncertainties (risks) which 
can be processed into standards. The key insights (developed in later chapters) 
are that: 
(i) technical imprecision is subordinate to, and may be amplified or 
reduced by behavioral  indeterminacy and social- organizational plur- 
alism creating m e r e n t  definitions of t h e  issues and problems; 
(ii) technical divergence in risk analysis is frequently not due to mere 
imprecision or ignorance, but to different, actively constructed e v e r t  
definitions of what the risk problem is to be analyzed [7]. These may 
partly reflect different institutional positions; 
(iii) there are continuities between the processes of expert and lay risk 
perception which are usually obliterated by heavy emphasis upon the 
supposedly categorical differences. Models of decision processes also 
tend to define the interest groups, their agendas and perceptions 
according to "the" issue and "the" decision process, whereas i t  seems 
more proper to define "the" decision process and "the" issue according 
to the full agendas, priorities and perceptions of different groups and 
organizations, including different experts. 
Previous work in the IIASA Risk group has analyzed the role of risk assess- 
ment  in decision processes in such fields as nuclear energy, liquid energy gas 
facilities, oil drilling blow-outs, etc. [8] As with most risk analysis, these all 
involve relatively monolithic technologies, each with fairly uniform risk- 
characteristics. The effects upon analytical divergence and uncertainty of 
different ezpert perceptions and definitions of the  technological-behavioral 
system (let alone lay definitions) can be seen even in these cases. However 
with its extreme heterogeneity, the concentration and transferability of waste, 
and its great behavioral indeterminacy, hazardous waste management poses 
the analytical issues more sharply, and poses a correspondingly more complex 
practical policy challenge. For these reasons, its international importance, and 
other reasons indicated throughout this work, hazardous waste appeared to be 
an analytically challenging and practically important topic to pursue within 
IIASA's risk management tradition. These appearances have not been disap- 
pointed. 
Previous work and familiarity v:ith the Ae!d in general lent several prem- 
ises to our research questions: 
1. Policy implementation requires more thorough analysis as an institu- 
tional, nor merely a technical problem; institutional analysis of 
implementability needs integration into mainstream policy analysis [9]. 
Policy making and policy analysis have in the past focussed too heavily 
upon optimizing policy-making decisions, relegating implementation to a s u p  
posedly trivial after-phase. Yet, unrealistic assumptions about implementation 
have often been built into policy decisions themselves, with subsequent failure 
to meet policy targets and promises. This not only squanders resources; i t  also 
undermines the credibility of the policy system, potentially entering a vicious 
circle of decreasing implementability. As a leading policy maker in the hazar- 
dous waste field has warned [lo]: 
the discrepancy between the daily practice of disposal and official pol- 
itical objectives and pretensions is obvious .... In many cases there is 
an obvious discrepancy between regulatory requirements and the 
actual means of meeting them. The enforcement gap is not only a 
permanent threat to  the environment, it also affects the credibility of 
legal provisions in place. 
2. Implementation constraints are strongly determined by the same institu- 
tional and technical factors which influenced policy making (legislation) in the  
first place . 
It is always valuable to trace the historical evolution of policy making con- 
cern and the emergence of a dominant public policy problem-definition. With 
such a historical perspective one may see how legislation on a given issue is 
shaped by relatively arbitrary factors. Seen this way, formal policy decisions 
are only one phase and not in any way an end-point in a continuous fiux of 
maneuvering and negotiation betwe en different groups. The technical dimen- 
sions of policy are nested in this process. Thus implementation constraints and 
options have to be examined and understood historically, in the light of the 
informal processes feeding into, and through legislation and formal policy deci- 
sions (e.g., specific regulations) into implemented (or non-implemented) real 
consequences. This has to be analyzed carefully a t  national and local levels, 
including their interactions. 
3. Formal risk assessments and related techniques need to  be integrated with 
an understanding of diverse organizational rationalities and perceptions. 
Risk-benefit analyses and other formal decision aid techniques assume 
that the rationality of optimization determined from some central policy level 
prevails throughout the policy domain. Yet, the implicit requirements of a 
given policy may be unrealistic with respect to the constraints and rationalities 
of other parts of the system, even within e.g. a single regulatory bureaucracy. 
This rationality may break down on these (and other) counts as a result of 
diverse local organizational and technical realities. Risk assessment for regu- 
lation has yet to progress far enough to take full account of implementation 
realities. Some have argued that  i t  is only the local transformation and even 
contradiction of central policy rationales by local actors which (informally) 
maintains the viability of such policies [ll]. This is discussed more in chapter 
three. 
4. Anxiety underlies decision making in this area, and interacts with the 
misuse of science. The resilience of the policy process as such is an issue. 
As already noted, implementation difficulties have given rise, at  least in 
the hazardous waste field, to  a feeling that  the credibility of decision making is 
under threat. "A climate of fear now dominates the discussion of environmen- 
tal issues" [12]. The dynamics of credibility and "legitimation" are complex and 
tortuous, but the consequences of its lack are highly concrete and vitally 
important. 
Previous work and the present study 
Several international organizations have conducted research or held 
expert meetings on hazardous waste management. It is therefore necessary to 
address the question: why another study? The reply is to be found by briefly 
examining the previously established work 
The largest study has been that undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, NATO Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS). This 
began in 1973, and was organized into working groups each of which tackled a 
specific aspect of the overall issue. A first phase was completed in 1977, and a 
subsequent phase in 1981 [13]. Late work has focused on the problems involved 
in reclaiming contaminated land. As more, uncontrolled landfill sites are found, 
and as controlled ones ml up and are closed down, the research may become of 
more and more importance. However the main effort of the broader CCMS work 
on hazardous waste management was more or less completed before any of the 
countries then legislating or about to  legislate policies for hazardous waste 
managements had been able to gain any experience of the formidable imple- 
mentation problems which have since become so prominent. Although valuable 
groundwork was laid in the NATO study, at that stage the general assumption 
tended to be that if loopholes existed in regulation, these could be closed by 
making legal definitions of key technical terms more scientifically accurate 
and precise, and by investing more effort in local enforcement. 
The NATO study examined regulatory/technical options. but was not sensi- 
tive to the full impact of dimensions of ignorance and uncertainty, nor to the 
interactions in implementation between different institutional arrangements, 
risk defining processes, and technical judgments and decisions. A further lirni- 
tation of any comparative insight from this study was that  it was confined to 
liberal market economies, and although there are many interesting differences 
of approach. amongst these, the opportunity for comparison with a centrally 
planned economy did not exist. 
One prophetic observation stands out from the 1977 Final Report of the 
NATO Study, but its prospective insight was not followed up in further research. 
It was noted that if implementation of hazardous waste legislation was not 
effective, the public credibility of the legal frameworks would be threatened. 
We would go further and add that  the credibility and viability of the governing 
institutions themselves is undermined by ineffective and uneven implementa- 
tion which has' been experienced since the NATO CCMS Report and the enact- 
ment of most hazardous waste legislation in the mid- to  late-1970s. 
The UN Environment Program has taken considerable interest in hazar- 
dous waste management since 1980. Under the adage that in hazardous waste 
as elsewhere, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," UNEP has 
attempted to provide a framework for ensuring that less developed countries do 
not repeat the mistakes of-industrialized countries which now find that the 
economic and political costs of old, uncontrolled waste-dumping far exceed the 
costs of controlled treatment and disposal from the start  [14]. Part  of this con- 
cern has caused UNEP to attempt to gather reliable data on the  production and 
movements of hazardous wastes, especially across international borders and to 
poor countries desperate for foreign currency and with no technical resources 
or infrastructures to  deal properly with such wastes. This initiative however is 
still in its earliest stages, an6 even national or regional authorities lack 
effective data on what they are  chargedwith regulating, where i t  goes, etc. 
A major concern of all international bodies has been the lack of an interna- 
tionally agreed definition of a hazardous waste. ~ t t e m ~ t s  at  conventional forms 
of regulation, such as registering and controlling all movements and disposals 
of hazardous waste, fall a t  this first hurdle because no workable universal 
definitions of the  crucial terms exist. Even so, such bodies continue to seek a 
formula that would act  as a single internationally meaningful framework into 
which all national and regional definitions and hazard classifications could be 
fitted. This objective has been the cornerstone of all attempts a t  regulation; 
where difficulties of harmonization and implementation of international agree- 
ments or directives have been encountered, the blame has been attached to 
imprecision in the key terms. The assumption has tended to be that  this could 
be eradicated by more careful analysis and technical precision. However more 
recently, some experts have begun to appreciate that  such apparently purely 
technical terms also inevitably incorporate local, particularistic administrative 
concerns and institutional factors 1151. This point has not been developed until 
the present work; yet i t  has radical policy implications. 
International policy initiatives therefore, such as UNEP/WHO1s 1983 colla- 
borative document, Hazardous Wmte Management - Policy Guidelines and Code 
of Rtxctice 1161 offer sound policy principles, which lack consideration of the 
problems of implementation as they arise in local institutional circumstances. 
Many of the very severe problems of implementation that  hazardous waste pol- 
icy has encountered have to do with the widely different perceptions, purposes 
and strategic definitions being used by diverse actors in the hazardous waste 
field. The European Commission's experience has been that  policy directives 
painstakingly negotiated and on the face of it, sound, are then watered down, 
and adapted in a variety of different, not always compatible or acceptable ways, 
by local institutional processes through which they have to pass in order to be 
implemented 1171. Even common technical definitions can take on widely 
different practical meanings when transformed from policy into implemented 
reality. 
OECD's Hazardous Waste Management policy group has been compiling and 
acting as an information-exchange forum for some years. Again, this is only for 
market economies This work has mainly been conducted on three fronts - 
dealing with past dumps; international transfers; and siting of new facilities. In 
connection w i t h  the problems of international movements, the OECD group has 
been attempting to develop a single cross-referencing chart which would 
"unify" the different hazard classifications schemes of all the OECD countries 
plus international conventions such as the London and Oslo sea-dumping con- 
ventions [18]. Like the work of other organizations such as EEC, OECD's contri- 
butions have been quite properly tied to more closely policy-defined needs, and 
have also in the -case of the hazard classification "dictionary" for example, 
reached the point where the problems of implementation of policy schemes just 
begin to rear their ugly head. 
With the possible exception of the UNEP work, al l  of the previous interna- 
tional policy analyses of hazardous waste management were conceived and/or 
conducted a t  a time of innocence about implementation difficulties yet to 
come. That innocence has rapidly and in some cases, painfully evaporated. We 
now know that making policy reality rather than myth involves far more than 
tightening up the crucial terms and definitions with more science. But the 
complex interactions between technical and institutional factors which make 
implementation such an important (thorgh stiil underrecognized) part of pol- 
icy nuking, have yet to  be understood and their implications clarified for policy 
processes and designs. This is where the IlASA group's experience lies. and 
where its work is targetted, as a complementary effort to those already in 
existence. 
One other important point of difference between our research and other 
internationally oriented work on this topic should be stressed. 
International policy and research bodies naturally tend to focus on the 
.international dimensions of the regulatory problem. However i t  is worth first 
examining where the international dimensions originate, so as not to take them 
-and their continued growth - for granted. There are two coinciding strands; 
(a) national and international companies "trade" many kinds of hazardous 
wastes to treatment and disposal facilities elsewhere. They wish to ensure free 
international movements as a general principle, and exert policy pressure 
accordingly; (b) they are supported by many national policy makers who see 
that public opposition to siting domestic facilities (or lack of industrial interest 
in investing in them) makes export of wastes an important outlet to maintain. 
Yet other political and economic realities mean that restricting cross border 
movements of most hazardous waste would be an attractive option. If the 
domestic conditions could be created to make this feasible, this would take a lot 
of pressure off the troubled international regulatory level. In addition, as we 
argue, technical harmonization needed for regulation a t  this level is intrinsi- 
cally limited by national institutional factors. Research on domestic policies 
and institutions - especially comparative research -is research on the inter- 
national policy options too. 
International policy research on hazardous waste has reached the present 
polnt, where experience from earlier researck and policy initiatives has gradu- 
ally led to the realization that the roots of the major international problems lie 
in local factors: international trading in hazardous waste, and perturbations in 
such systems are affected by domestic difficulties in establishing treatment and 
disposal facilities; international standardization of hazardous waste definitions 
as a means of international regulatory control is made impossible by the 
incompatible, diverse local administrative functions and meanings of such 
technical frameworks. 
It has taken major international efforts and initiatives to work backwards 
to this point. Entering the field rather later, and with a different background, 
we have therefore gone straight to inter-national c o m p a r a t i v e  research, on 
those different local roots and what grows from them. Only after this local 
comparative focus can we then return to the international policy domain with a 
better understanding of the constraints and potentials of the options for design 
of effective international policies and institutional arrangements. 
IU. Science for Public Policy 
Underlying this research and previous risk assessment work at IlASA have 
been a lasting interest in the roles of science in risk management-policy prob- 
lems in general [19]. 
As discussed later, there are fundamentally different ways of defining 
hazardous waste management as a policy problem. The dominant public per- 
ception is of a risk management problem, yet from the policy making stand- 
point i t  is more a controlled industrial development problem. To policy makers 
the "hazardous" aspect of .hazardous waste is a relatively minor issue, and their 
main concern in this domain is to convince an uneasy public that this is so 
[201. 
"Extensive efforts are needed to inform the public better on the techn- 
ical criteria involved in hazardous waste disposal and on how far pre- 
cautionary measures are taken to exclude or limit short term and 
long term risks. It has to be demonstrated to the public that disposal 
facilities are designed and managed properly so that  people feel 
confident that things are done in the right way and in the interest of 
citizens themselves .... There are experiences well proved and per- 
suasive disposal concepts and technologies existing. What we have to 
do is to sell them better to the public." 
Largely as a result of this pressure to justify policy commitments to third par- 
ties in several areas, environmental policy and the regulatory use of risk 
management has assumed the existence of developed scientific underpinnings 
which are not there. To some extent this has been beneficial in forcing such 
scientific attention and development in e.g. toxicology, like the strategy of 
regulatory forcing of pollution control technology development. But frequently 
the elaboration of statutory regulations (and political pressure behind them) 
has proceeded as if the science were already developed, and has created enor- 
mous pressure to produce the necessary "applied science" very hastily. and 
within strong constraints as to the scope and depth of such research. The 
understatement of various kinds of uncertainties and methodological limita- 
tions, and even downright falsification [21], has been an inevitable result. This 
has all been based upon the misconception that the science either was in place, 
or could be definitively developed to an external mandate, in a given time. 
Even if bureaucratic dynamics require a belief in objective, rule-bound 
knowledge, the full extent of this policy "forcing" of science, and of the 
ignorance, uncertainty, variability and lack of normal scientific standards 
which i t  leaves, is increasingly, if incoherently, recognized in public, leading to 
loss of credibility. This suggests that a fundamentally different approach may 
be necessary. Rather than create policy and foster international mechanisms 
which rely upon or suggest that definitive and elaborate scientific knowledge 
can be used to meet legal and statutory rules embodied in policy, i t  may be 
necessary to devise a more explicitly adaptive. open-ended regulatory process. 
This would recognize the i n t r i n s i c ,  i n s t i t u t i a n a l l y  c u l t i v a t e d  nature of scientific 
uncertainties, and would therefore explicitly allow in policy design for the  evo- 
lution of scientific uncertainties and of the negotiation of their interpretation 
into policies [22]. Some systems approach this adaptive model more than oth- 
ers, though their adaptation may be essentially private to the regulator and 
regulated party. A main part of our research has been to explore this idea, 
especially attempting: (i) to characterize more clearly the types of uncertainty 
which are  critical in this issue, and (ii) to  understand the crucial dimension of 
interaction between public attitudes towards regulatory science, and the  role 
for science which regulatory institutions tend to  express. 
Frequently, hastily produced science has been used as if i t  were definitive 
knowledge so as to  bolster policy positions on risks, only to  have tha t  science 
later shown up in public as  incomplete or shoddy. Often it may be only "incorn- 
plete" against unrealistic expectations or criteria laid down, for example, in 
legal processes; but there is a basic confusion between the use of science to  
produce h t h  (which in these areas usually only means overwhelming uncer- 
tainties and decision-paralyzing sets  of qualifications to every statement) and 
its use (and overuse) in cultivating public authomky. Many policymakers, not  
taking the hazard issue too seriously, use science to  bolster public authority 
without appreciating the intrinsic backlash they may be setting up. 
Even scientists themselves tend to have dnderestimated the extent of 
informal judgements and unspecifiable decision rules within science; these can- 
not be formally jusiified, especially not in skeptical settings such as policy or 
legal arenas. When so tested therefore, they frequently fail the test of credibil- 
ity 1231. This not only damages specific policies or claims, but the institutions' 
general credibility because they have pinned their public authority to  
simplistic images of science. The frequent response to signs of this diminishing 
credibility (as in siting paralysis) is to produce more science. performed in 
hasty circumstances, and thus inadvertently to intensify the negative feedback 
effect. 
Comparative research in this field is valuable because it indicates how 
flexible is the use of the same science, to the same current regulatory pur- 
poses, in different institutional settings. Decision rules in science are not fixed 
and fully specifiable - this is part of the flexibility of science. This creates 
difficulties in justifying scientific decisions which have policy commitments 
(e.g., the social allocation of health risks) inextricably embedded in them. 
Different political cultures distribute the responsibilities for public authority 
very differently through their institutional networks, with correspondingly 
different demands upon science, and different implicit claims about the nature 
of issues. 
IV. Organization of Study and Outline of Chapters 
The unifying theme of this study is the influence of institutional settings 
on the ways in which technical knowledge is used and risks are d e h e d  for regu- 
lation. The following chapters examine different institutional settings and uses 
of technical knowledge in an attempt to clarify which factors in M e r e n t  set- 
tings are essential to the issue as it is found in whichever setting, which factors 
are essential to a given regulatory institutional setting; and how these inter- 
sect to infi~lence the implementation of national policies. This was designed as 
a first necessary phase, before being able more thoroughly to examine the 
international policy dimensions. 
Before outlining the chapters, some brief mention should be made of the 
way this study was conducted. As indicated, the research was intended as a first 
necessary phase, to examine national institutional settings, before returning 
better equipped to address the international dimension more directly. 
Without the resources to employ field workers under our control, operating 
to a common methodological framework on a common. specific decision prob- 
lem (e-g.. a siting issue) in several countries, we have had to be pragmatic and 
opportunistic, moulding possibilities of external collaboration towards our con- 
cerns, and to some extent in return shaping our framework in the light of those 
possibilities. Our strategy has been to identify a few key themes. then to iden- 
tify in which countries those theme questions are most sharply drawn amongst 
the countries in which we have conducted significant research. Thus chapters 
four to  six inclusive are theme chapters, with "lead countries" illustrating 
those theme issues; though they all contain comparative materials, these are 
not developed in equal depth. This is an inevitable limitation of our study, but 
it should be remembered that  we are offering a structure to the  key 'policy 
questions, not claiming solid policy conclusions. 
The next chapter outlines three different possible strategic policy orienta- 
tions towards hazardous waste, and shows how they often conflict with one 
another in reality. For hazardous waste management the need for industrial 
innovation is dominant. more so than for (dispersed) conventional emissions, 
and conflicts sharply in some dimensions with environmental risk management 
strategies. Chapter one then goes on to examine the main structural proper- 
ties of hazardous waste as  an issue that  are universal and thus potentially 
cross-cut or  underly the imprint of different regulatory cultures in which the 
issue finds itself being managed These properties also strongly influence the 
ways in which risk assessment could be used in the policy management of 
hazardous wastes. 
Chapter two evaluates this question by reviewing the general state of the 
ar t  in risk assessment. It also extends the current state of understanding in its 
treatment of uncertainty and expert problem-perception. This chapter stresses 
the correspondence between the different structuring of decision rules in sci- 
ence for risk management and different institutional structures of regulation. 
This underlying framework allows an examination of the tension between stan- 
dardization of scientific risk criteria and regulations, and variable, situatjon- 
specific optimization. Chapter three begins by looking at  the more extensive 
structure of possible regulatory nodes in hazardous waste management, and 
evaluates the lands of risk assessment relevant to each point of influence. A 
key observation of chapter three is that hazardous waste belongs to a class of 
policy issues whose uncertainties embody multiple, contradictory definitions of 
the problem, and even widely divergent constructions of apparently straightfor- 
ward, 'crucial' data such as hazardous waste arisings and movements (or in 
other fields. deforestation rates and fuel wood consumption). It is shown how 
this extra dimension of ignorance with heterogeneity makes the 
standardization-situational optimization dilemma unusually difficult in the 
hazardous waste case, so much so that a management option of institutional 
risk-absorption becomes more attractive. This strategy has been pursued in 
some states of the FRG, and Denmark, and is planned in Hungary. I t  is 
explained more in chapter three, and exa-mined in greater depth in chapter 5. 
Chapter four then examines the institutional origins and processes of con- 
struction of the key management tools of hazard classification of wastes, in 
different administrative settings. The main comparison examined is between 
the US and FRG. Differences of classification are  identified as originating in the  
different regulatory and political cultures, and specifically, different adminis- 
trative p7poses embodied along with technical cr i ter ia  in the  classifications. 
Chapter five examines the management schemes of Bavaria and Hesse in 
the  FRG and Denmark which are centralized a t  t h e  s ta te  or  lower level, with 
unusually strong institutional structures of shared responsibility and unitary 
control, 'absorbing' risk decisions into routine management  of t he  system. The 
conclusion of our  work is tha t  this institutional strategy may well be necessary 
for adequate regulation and public acceptance and could only work i f  the 
market  for such central facilities is protected by controlling exports from a 
region. 
Chapter six examines an  opposite case in the  UK, of decentralized policy 
with background central advice, and informal but  low proflle supervision. Here 
the  management of T & D is very fragmented and heterogeneous, with almost 
totally private-industry responsibility for T & D, and local authority responsibil- 
ity for all aspects of implementation and important  aspects of policy too. The 
interaction between local authorities with mainly very poor resources, central 
government regulators with a strong informal network of coUabomfion with 
industry, and scientific resources for regulation, i s  the main theme of this 
chapter. 
Chapter seven is an attempt to draw some tentative conclusions. It also 
draws upon IIASA and other work in the field of risk perception and social atti- 
tudes. to offer a framework ior interpreting the  implications of different regula- 
tory styles for public opposition and thus, broader management  viability. 
Finally, since this was a n  exploratory first-phase study, this chapter  s t ructures  
and discusses some options for further policy research aimed a t  better 
international policy management of this issue. 
Case studies are included which were performed by collaborators in Hun- 
gary and the Netherlands. These offer sharp contrasts of economic structure. 
level of economic turnover, and political-administrative culture. Nevertheless 
certain common themes emerge, notably in the problems each country is hav- 
ing in even approaching the creation and implementation of an industrial 
infrastructure for waste treatment and disposal, let alone managing it in an 
acceptably risk-controlling manner 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
HAZARDOUS WASTE -WHAT I(IND OF ISSUE? 
Brian Wynne 
I. THE SOCIAL CONSI'RUCTION OF NATURAL PROBLEW 
Like other policy issues, hazardous waste is not a "given" problem, with a 
natural internal structure and boundaries. These are socially defined, for a 
variety of reasons, often conflicting. This fact is not altered by the prominent 
technical dimensions of such issues. I t  is always worth digging into the histori- 
cal emergence and current  limits of such problems as formally defined, to see 
how unndud and even arbitrary such boundaries may be. and to understand 
their flexibility towards social influences. 
The purpose of this is not to suggest that the problems are therefore 
unmanweable (tkough the  possible redefinition of soci,:l acd natural factors 
entailed by the exercize may invite a redefinition of "policy management"). 
The purpose is to better understand the interaction and scope of local variables 
and universal dimensions in the issues under management. Let us look a t  just 
some of the  boundaries: 
1. Like squeezing a balloon in one place causing i t  to inflate in another. 
hazardous waste as  a problem for treatment and disposal is inflated by disallow- 
ing atmospheric or aqueous dispersal of pollutants; and vice-versa. 
2. "Hazardous" waste should include municipal, household waste, because the  
toxicity of leachates from municipal landfills is often a t  least as bad as tha t  
from controlled "hazardous" waste landfills [I]. Yet municipal waste is 
excluded, not on technical risk grounds, but on pragmatic logistic and political 
grounds. To control municipal wastes as hazardous would not only swamp 
organizational and financial resources, but probably create enormous political 
reaction too. 
3. Radioactive waste disposal falls under entirely separate legislation interest 
groups and institutions. Although there are analogies some technical parallels, 
and strong overlaps in terms of siting difficulties, hazardous waste management 
normally excludes radioactive wastes [2]. 
4. Hazardous waste should include all domestic sewage, which is usually itself 
toxic in organic mat ter  and often mixed with e.g. heavy metals. The US EPA's 
standard test for toxicity of wastes to  define them as hazardous was relaxed by 
a factor of 10 in concentration limits of certain compounds in leachates. 
because the  original criterion would have meant the  inclusion of most domestic 
sewage, again swamping the system. So the fence is socially defined to exclude 
sewage 131. 
5. Most systems exclude mill and mine tailings just because they are so colos- 
sally voluminous and thus logistically impossible. It  also seems to offend com- 
mon sense that  something should be neutral when in the ground, but when 
eztracted, even if a toxic component (e.g., a metal) has been removed, it is 
regarded as toxic waste. This kind of issue caused a major controversy in the 
US, where oil drilling muds and brines were initially defined as hazardous 
wastes, only eventually to be excluded because the implications for the oil 
exploration industry were so horrendous. Dow Chemical also (in the end suc- 
cessfully) argued against having brine from which they had extracted Bromine 
being defined as hazardous waste when they pumped the less toxic brine back 
where they had extracted it from [4]. 
6. Many common natural substances would be defined as hazardous waste if 
the definitions used in regulations were strictly enacted. We have mentioned 
the examples of "phenolic substances" (wood) and "biocides" (salt) elsewhere. 
Again, some regulatory definitions of hazardous waste by "reactivity" include 
emission of methane and hydrogen sulfide. Without discretionary freedom to 
ignore this criterion when pragmatically necessary, all domestic wastes would 
have to be regulated as hazardous. 
7. Many hazardous wastes are exempted from certain national regulatory sys- 
tems because they are dealt with in-house by their producer. This excluded 
proportion of all hazardous waste is estimated to be as high as 60-70% in several 
countries. I t  is thus a major factor in social narrowing of the official problem 
dehi t ion.  
In order to gain further perspective on the extent of this selective regula- 
tory attention, it is useful to remind ourselves of some figures of the following 
kina [5]: 
1. There are about 7,000,000 known chemicals 
2. Approximately 80,000 are in commercial circulation 
3. Approximately 1,000 new chemicals enter  commercial use each year 
4. In total world laboratory resources, about 500 per year could be 
testable for toxicity (at colossal expen'se) 
5. One test,  for carcinogenicity alone, can involve 800 tes t  animals, and 
40 different t issue specimens per animal for pathology examinations; 
t ha t  is, 32,000 specimens, needmg $500,000 and 3 1/2 years 
6. Approximately 14,000 food additives and contaminants 
7. US EPA hazardous substances list contains approximately 500 sub- 
s tances 
8. UK and EEC hazardous substances list contains about 30 i tems 
9. The US EPA's EP t e s t  for hazardous wastes covers only 14 chemicals 
10. In the  US, OSHA has  regulated no new chemical for 6 years. 
Even this rough indexing indicates just how severely any  hazardous waste 
management framework reduces the full scope of the  potential 'natural '  issue* 
to proportions with which i t  can cope. This reduction creates  artificial boun- 
daries and internal s t ruc tures  such as  volume and concentration cut-offs, 
which have little to  do with objective natural dictates, and much to do with 
social factors, pragmatic necessities and administrative purposes. This leaves 
many central aspects of t he  problem - even apparently technical mat te rs  - 
open to varying, even contradictory d e h i t i o n  and ambiguity. As we shall see, 
neither "hazard," "waste," nor "managemeni" have intrinsic natural meanings 
free of variable social-institutional determination. This is t rue  be tween  
'Natural' here is a deliberately ambiguous term, since although the overall problem is 
from the regulatory level often perceived as natural, it is of course created by social 
processes at another level (i.e., industrial production). 
different national or state systems, and between dfferent groups within the 
sane system. 
Historically the developing framework of environmental regulation has fol- 
lowed relatively self-evident empirical categories--specific media such as public 
hygiene, food, water, air, soil; or specific agents such as pesticides. Different 
interest gro$ps, different economic and other constraints, different legislative 
initiatives and implementing institutions, and different technical specialist 
inputs have tended to compartmentalize policies, regulations, and practices 
into these separate fields. Each has developed its own momentum and tradi- 
tions, often leading to arbitrary discontinuities, division of labor or attention. 
lack of coordrnation of standards and approaches, inconsistencies, loopholes. 
and an overall wastage of scarce regulatory resources. Yet actions and 
approaches in one field may have strong effects upon neighboring areas. 
Thus, for example, the hazardous waste problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that it eventually came to regulatory attention largely through the problem of 
ordinary waste management. Since this was always a low priority issue com- 
pared to air, water or food pollution, it was only subjected to explicit attempts 
a t  control through legislation later than all the other environmental areas. 
This has meant that cleaning dispersive emissions to  air and water to meet 
tightening regulations for those media has left increased volumes of contarn- 
inated residues of more concentrated hazardous materials such as filter 
sludges, dry-precipitated dusts, slags and so on. Indeed it was the dramatic 
impact of previous regulation in the convectional areas up03 volumes of toxic 
sludges, concentrated liquids, etc., which eventually stimulated industrial and 
regulatory concern about hazardous (packaged or concentrated) wastes. These 
inter-media switches are the product of unsystematic sectoral decisions 
Waddell refers to the syndrome of "solving one environmental media problem at 
the expense of another medium," and in particular, "a tendency to generate 
solid/hazardous waste problems [by] solving air and water discharge prob- 
lemsW[6]. A sense of their potential scale is given by noting that a typical 
medium scale coal fired power station burning medium grade sulfur coal, would 
yield hazardous solid waste of one square mile of elemental sulfur one foot 
deep, if all the sulfur were electrostatically precipitated out from the normal 
annual aerial emissions [?I. 
The issues and processes are basically continuous across the socially con- 
structed and established boundaries of legislative framing, administrative com- 
petence, technical specialization and political-economic interest. There is no 
guarantee that such boundaries bear any relationship to some optimal overall 
environmental or economic norm, indeed there are many reasons to suppose 
the opposite. Yet, for better or for worse, these labyrinthine socially institu- 
tionalized boundaries and divisions, often contradictory, have developed and 
evolved as the concrete reality which policy making and implementation has to 
understand and live with. They have substantial, objective* causal effect on 
events, just like physical reality. Of course, some of these institutional 
processes and structures may be significant obstacles to better practice, and 
some may be more adaptable a t  less cost and less disruption than others. Some 
will be more resistant to  change than may appear, because they are connected 
with and imply the support of other commitments not immediately evident by 
stufying only the issue as conventionally defined. 
By "objective" here we do not mean unbiassed in some ultimate sewe,  but that there are 
intrinsic dynamics that have a certain pattern and stability which takes over independent of 
specidc interests and choices. 
The arbitrariness of the institutional patterns carving up natural systems 
is sharpened by conflicting pressures: (i) on the one hand the logic of inter- 
media connections and movements of pollutants coincides with the political 
pressure towards centralization of pollution management, (ii) on the other 
hand the logic of fragmentation within regulatory bureaucracies analyzed as an 
expression of rational organizational response to their environment. Bureau- 
cratic regulatory fragmentation corresponds with issue fragmentation as inter- 
nal groups specialize towards particular problems, expertises and external 
interests,  and define separate boundaries round their fields of attempted con- 
trol [ 8 ] .  
There is no preordained formula resolving such conKicting institutional 
tendencies -compromises evolve ad-hoc. The ,point only adds emphasis to the  
previous observation that  there is nothing given or natural about the shape and 
character  of hazardous waste management as an issue. The area contains shift- 
ing, multiple and even somewhat contradictory definitions and boundaries, not 
just as academic abstractions but as  live vehicles of policy interaction manipu- 
lated by policy actors themselves. 
II. THREE SlRATEGIC ORJENTATIONS 
Thus, even from a central policy standpoint, there are at least three 
different but interacting primary definitions of hazardous waste management 
as a policy problem: 
1. As an extension of conventional fields of pollution abatement. 
risk management and environmental protection. 
Hazardous waste in the form of concentrated solid or aqueous wastes, 
being historically the last area to be regulated, has encountered not only 
greater volumes of such "packaged" wastes due to  earlier tightening in air, 
water emissions, etc., but also less room left in which to  maneuver over 
different possible options for proper treatment and disposal. Thus physical 
prohibition (e.g. discharge limits) or ambient performance standards as regula- 
tory instruments for air, water, etc., left some room for autonomous choice by 
an industry or set of industries as to how to meet such standards. Hazardous 
waste management, however, is being more or less forced to  become more posi- 
tively interventionist and to d w e c t  industrial practices and choices--as Wolbeck 
has put it [9]: 
A sound policy should not confhe itself to saying what should not be 
done, but should, above all, indicate what should be done. 
This naturally leads to more potential conflict between industry and regulatory 
bodies, and implies more of a "political" burden on science as technical 
justification for interventionist directives, as will be bscussed in chapter two. 
A further implication of the  risk management perspective is tha t  the prob- 
lem area should be capable of definition in terms of risks to  human health and 
valued environmental entities, and in comparative terms where possible. Yet, 
the hazardous waste issue is in important respects simply under-ripe as a pol- 
icy issue amenable t o  conventional risk management processes-it may be dom- 
inated by dimensions of ignorance rather than d e h a b l e  risks. This important 
difference may be obscured by the social process wherein organisations gradu- 
ally redefine such radical uncertainties as manageable probability functions 
[lo]. 
2. As a problem of establishing a new industrial-organizational 
wastructure.  
Although conventional pollution control needs technological development 
(e.g. in filter systems), t he  concentrati.on, trade, t rea tment  and disposal of 
hazardous wastes requires a whole new industrial infrastructure to  be created. 
When most industrial countries enacted legislation on hazardous or "special" 
wastes in the 1970's, few of t h e m  had much existing industrial facilities for col- 
lection, transport,  t rea tment  and disposal of hazardous industrial wastes, 
beyond what was available for ordinary garbage. An urgent  problem was, there- 
fore, t o  develop such a industrial infrastructure; indeed the  U.S. EPA's aim in 
implementing t h e  1976 Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RcRA) was t o  
stimulate the growth of such an industry via private investment in relatively 
well known technological processes. The purpose of t he  regulations was to  
create  a large, attractive market  of hazardous wastes legally requiring licensed 
t reatment;  free enterprise  would do the  rest. A s  Kragg describes i t  [4], this 
failed t o  happen for a complex set  of reasons. One of these has undoubtedly 
been the  unusually direct connection between the details of regulations being 
drafted but whose final shape was uncertain, and not  only the  scale of the 
potential market  of wastes thus  defined, but  also of the degree of regulatory 
intervention in t h e  choice. design and operation of the industrial plant felt 
necessary to  fulfill the regulation [ll.]. Other countries, such as  the Nether- 
lands and U.K., adopted similar approaches to the  U.S. The Netherlands, for 
example, enacted legislation to  regulate chemical wastes by identification, 
registration and prohibition of lax landfill, before developing an industrial 
t rea tment  and disposal infrastructure. It  was persuaded by industry tha t  such 
an infrastructure already existed, but of the three central elements, one 
developed serious technical difficulties, one was closed down after scandal and 
court  case jailed its directors, and the other was export. Any opportunity to  
plan and develop adequate t rea tment  and disposal facilities ahead of legislation 
which would supposedly create  the  demand for t hem was always severely res- 
tricted, especially by freedom t o  use cheaper export options. Other regions or 
countries,  such a s  Bavaria and Hesse in the  F.R.G., built upon systems of public 
facilities previously established a t  s ta te  or local levels, including measures t o  
protect their  industrial waste catchment.  
From this perspective there  is less of a perceived problem over t h e  
scientific basis of different risks, t rea tment  and disposal methods, etc. These 
tend  to  be regarded as well established and unproblematic compared to  the  
organizational problems of (a) evolving an infrastructure, then (b) making i t  
work effectively as an organizational problem, channelling the  right wastes to 
the  right t reatment  and disposal route. The burden of regulation and risk 
management  falls more in the a rea  of controlling the emergence of a techni- 
cally competent, professionally responsible organizational network in the  form 
of some mix of private and public industrial operators. However, there  is strong 
interaction between technical definitions of hazard a s  embodied in s tatutory 
Lists and scheduled tests, and industrial freedom to  operate within decision 
margins tha t  give a reasonable chance of economic viability. 
3. As a problem in recycling wastes. or.reducing their volumes 
and specific toxicities by changing industrial production 
tecbniques. 
In this perspective there  a re  some overlaps with 2., but  the  focus is very 
different. Despite the prominence given to resource recovery, recycle and 
waste reduction in the public language and aims of hazardous waste 
management policies, the  reality is tha t  rates  of recycling have languished, 
even fallen back in recent  years [12]. Undoubtedly a critical problem is the  
apparently inevitable general lack of security concerning the instability of the 
input "raw materialsu-someone else's wastes--to recovery plants which may be 
highly sensitive to  input composition. It is generally agreed tha t  here, techni- 
cal possibilities a r e  again severely undermined by institutional factors includ- 
ing contradictory perceptions of t h e  materials in question. 
Recovery and recycling would be continuous with t rea tment  and disposal, 
except for a critical, yet problematic, regulatory boundary which divides them. 
Recovery and recycling imply that  the materials a r e  goods, whereas t reatment  
and  disposal imply t h a t  they are wastes. If they are  defined as the  former they 
a re  exempt from regulation, yet the discrimination is ambiguous, slippery and 
dependent upon who is defining it. A galvanic sludge containing copper, for 
example, might be "stored" uncontrolled against speculation on the  future 
price of copper! 
Recovery and recycle also overlaps with, but  is different from innovation in 
waste reducing production technologies, since the lat ter  is self-evi~ently in- 
house to the  waste generator,  whereas recovery and recycle may well be 
through transfer t o  some other  operator(s). 
The production-innovation approach has found i t s  sharpest conceptual 
expression in proposals t o  integrate notions of ' true'  waste costings in strategic 
planning and choice of new processes and  products in industry. To some extent 
this is happening in a few places. A rr,.ajor problem of any waste-reiucing stra- 
tegy is t h a t  i t  directly conflicts with the t rea tment  and disposal infrastructure 
development or maintenance, because i t  undermines the  market,  thus  viabil- 
ity, of the latter.  
These different perspectives on the policy management definition imply 
different needs in terms of: areas of regulatory competence and recruitment; 
instruments to control or stimulate industrial activity; investments in plant 
and processes as well as underlying R and D; organizational arrangements 
within regulatory bodies; interest group configurations; tensions with surround- 
ing economic and administrative practices; and decision making techniques 
and related resources. In other words, they imply wholly different policy 
arrangements even though they intersect in a large ill-defined arena. 
Thus, even within this environmental policy area there are  conflicting ten- 
dencies, on the one hand, towards integration, not only with other environmen- 
tal fields, but also with broader industrial development and technology policies: 
and on the other hand, fragmentation into coherent, discrete and manageable 
decision making units. 
Several other policy currents and historical patterns thread the hazardous 
waste management field. Again. their properties and the conflicts between 
some of these help d e h e  some basic constraints which d e c t  optimal manage- 
men t. 
IU. HETOKICAL DEWEIDPMENT OF THE ISSUE 
One important conflict is the evolution of regulatory concern for hazar- 
dous wastes from ordinary local authority garbage collection, treatment and 
disposal. Regardless of toxic chemical hazard, this was already a problem for 
which Legislation was being developed. in the early 1970's; "special" waste 
arrangements received only minor attention. The point is that  institutional 
infrastructures existed and attention-albeit fragmented-was already focussed 
a t  local level on solid wastes. The management of hazardous or "special" wastes 
was seen at first as a relatively routine extrapolation of arrangements a t  this 
level. This has important implications discussed in Chapter two. 
Two events and one other growing influence upset this tradition and 
imposed upon it a strong pressure towards centralization: 
1. The 1974 energy crisis created an intensive concern with energy and other 
resources recovery from waste materials generally. Many technical and indus- 
trial aspects of such recovery needed research and development and thus the 
impetus of central governments to advance them. Also central governments 
needed to  respond to a general sense of crisis by being seen to do something 
centrally to overcome the problems. The concern for the hazardous dimen- 
sions of waste management developed only after waste management had 
become a policy issue for resource and energy conservation reasons [13]. 
2. The major shocks like discoveries of past toxic dumps a t  Lekkerkerk in the 
Netherlands and Love Canal in the US created such political reverberation and 
economic implications of cleaning up that only central governments could 
marshal the necessary resources and authority to respond 1141. Erupting pub- 
lic disquiet and insecurity was reflected in frantic regulatory and legislative 
responses which suddenly brought hazardous wastes from relative obscurity to 
the forefront of attention even in pre-existing Acts like RCRA 1121. Despite this 
sudden advance to central policy attention (or perhaps because i t  was also so 
rapid), the legislation being developed proved inadequate to deal with the issue 
of unanticipated toxic dumps from the past, and separate legislation had to be 
hurriedly enacted to deal with thls issue in t he  L.2.A and the Netherla~ds. 
Also, although this history rapidly created a public definition of the issue as one 
of htzzadous waste control, the authorities in many countries still tended to 
see i t  more as a problem O F  industrial development. 
3. It is significant that early regulatory attempts for hazardous waste were 
diverse local initiatives. thus another major impetus towards integrated hazar- 
dous waste management has been the desire on the part of industry for con- 
sistency and predictability between diverse decentralized control initiatives, 
and for equal terms of trade and competition in respect of extra production 
costs due to compliance with standards. In this sense, hazardous waste 
management has followed national and international concern about hazardous 
goods regulations, where definitions and registrations of hazardous materials, 
and acceptable toxic testing standards, have been the main concern. The 
OECD's program on toxic chemicals regulation, for example, has explicitly 
incorporated adequate disposal of wastes as part of an integrated, anticipatory 
control framework covering the entire life-cycle of a chemical, from inception 
(as a good or a waste, regardless) to grave [15]. 
There is a growing amount of hazardous waste being transported across 
national frontiers. Elaborate and expensive research on toxicology is more 
directly associated with toxic goods (where the value of the materials justifies 
the expense of research for risk assessment purposes) and passes on to hazar- 
dous waste only indirectly, as the latter are derivatives of the former. Uniform 
international standards and test protocols are important to industries. who fear 
that artificially tight standards might be used by a country as a concealed 
import restriction to protect a domestic industry. However, viewed another 
way, industry is not averse to lax standards elsewhere when they allow it to 
export hazardous goods or wastes. Lax standards in one country may drain the 
domestic business needed in another country to support a viable treatment and 
disposal infrastructure. 
The pressure, therefore, towards international coordination of hazardous 
waste, as well as hazardous goods, policies has grown beyond even the centrali- 
zation a t  national level of originally local arrangements. The appropriate reach 
of such international coordination, specific agreements, or legislation (in the 
EEC case) alongside national, provincial and local responsibilities is a problem 
[16] which still needs clarification. Thus the  European Commission, for exam- 
ple, has issued Directives on hazardous waste management [17] which have had 
to adopt a realistic respect for member countries' jealous adherence to cher- 
ished policies and procedures. Directives thus allow the necessary flexibility of 
approach and talk in terms of the same policy goals being achieved, the  means 
being up to each member country. The problem with this has been that flexibil- 
ity on the means of implementing a policy is in reality tantamount to fragment- 
ing the original policy itself, so the temptation has been to try to restrict 
national discretion by issuing central, more elaborately and strictly defined 
implementing regulations. 
A fine balance has . to  be maintained between central dctat ion and local 
discretion, but this is easily unhinged by surprises. An example was the 
requirement, created overnight by the political hue-and-cry all over Europe 
about the 41 lost Seveso barrels. This created the suddent demand for tight 
regulations about cross-border transport of hazardous wastes, to a very rapid 
deadline, when a Directive embodying a painstakingly negotiated compromise 
between the Commission and member states had been drafted and was about to 
be enacted [ 181. 
In summary, therefore, there would seem to be a few fundamental ques- 
tions underlying analysis of this policy area: 
1. Is it possible practically to reconcile what a re ,  even from a single central 
standpoint, different definitions of the  core policy problem, and the  central pol- 
icy goals? 
2. How do the  different institutional patterns in different national systems 
emphasize different profiles of these three strategic orientations? 
3. How do these deflnitions proliferate, with what practical implications, when 
one identifies diverse other  actors and interests  in this policy field, even within 
a given regulatory setting? 
4. What are the  key kinds of ignorance and uncertainty undermining bet ter  
policy management,  and how might they be brought within a managerial 
frame? Does emergent public concern demand a conventional risk manage- 
men t  policy definition even if t he  issue and t h e  science are  not appropriate a t  
least as  yet, for such a definition? 
lV. COMPARATIVE POLICY SYSTEMS AND UNIVERSAL TECHNOLOGY - 
Significant Structural Properties of Hazardous Waste as an Issue 
One of the common problems encountered in attempting to implement 
hazardous waste management policies has been incompatibility of approaches 
in different jurisdictions which, because they a re  connected by trade. economic 
and other  legal patterns and overlaps. imply the  need for some consistency and 
continuity of practice across those boundaries, whether these a re  inter- 
province, inter-state, or  inter-nation. These differences of approach straddle all 
levels: 
i )  political philosophy and constitutional t rad t ions ;  
(ii) legal systems; 
(iii) administrative traditions and practices; 
(iv) technical policy evaluations and choices; and 
(v) detailed technical classifications, criteria standards and definitions. 
Research on regulation of risks and environmental pollution has shown 
how different political and administrative cultures influence the style of regula- 
tory decision making, and produce different outcomes in regulatory decisions 
on the same issue [19]. Even with the same scientific base available, technical 
judgements, implicit burdens of proof and standards of acceptable risk vary sys- 
tematically according to the institutional context in which they evolve. Furth- 
ermore, even the same regulatory technical t e rm may be given different practi- 
cal meanings in different regulatory cultures. 
The pressure towards consistency arising from international or interre- 
gional equity, planning and free trade considerations is tempered by the 
sovereignty of different countries' legal and administrative traditions. Techni- 
cal harmonization is feasible to some extent, but ultimately limited by this fac- 
tor. 
Thus cross-cultural comparative research on regulation of specific issues 
has helped to  elucidate practically, how far i t  is realistic to push international 
technical harmonization programs before one begins to imply cutting into the 
sovereignty and internal consistency of administrative styles, and thus risking 
purely symbolic, non-implementable gestures rather than policies. For exam- 
ple, the attempt to establish precise concentration threshold values of hazar- 
dous chemicals to define legally regulable wastes uniformly across countries in 
a trade area such as the EEC would encounter opposition from countries which 
as a g e m d  decision making style, not only on the  single issue in question, 
have institutionalized scientific advice so as to give selected scientists large 
areas of informal discretionary judgement in policy decision mahng.  To 
change the regulatory method or style on one issue to make i t  i n te rna t iona l l y  
consistent on that issue would not only threaten established institutional 
arrangements for that issue; it  would also undermine the more general require- 
ment of domestic consistency of decision makng style across different issues 
within the same political-legal culture. 
As Wilson's collection of essays analyzing several regulatory bodies in the 
U.S. has shown, however, the uniform imprint of a given political culture upon 
all issues under its domain is qualified and differentiated by the specific charac- 
teristics of each issue and the unique. history of legislation, interest-group 
interaction, etc., in each case 1201. Despite some common features relating to 
their common political-constitutional setting, therefore, the EPA, for example, 
operates in a very different style from, say, the Federal Trade Commission; and 
even within the EPA, decision making styles may vary significantly (with impli- 
cit inconsistencies of standards*) betwe.en, say, Drinking Water Control and 
Solid Waste Management. 
In order to clarify the extent of different regulatory options and con- 
straints, it  is therefore necessary to delineate the significant 
i n t r ins ic  technical and intitutional features of the issue which will have to be 
accommodated by whichever regulatory culture confronts the issue. This sec- 
tion therefore identifies the important universal characteristics of the hazar- 
:Ictls waste issue which shape the local and international possibilities for design 
of optimal regulation: 
* Thomas and Roberts [15] relate the story of the pesticide standard being promulgated for 
RCRA, whch would have meant that an apple could be sold and eaten, but not disposed of on 
a municipal garbage dump. The anomaly in this case was noticed and rectified. 
1. Heterogeneity 
Potentially hazardous chemical wastes arise in almost every kind of indus- 
trial, and many non-industrial activities. Chemicals are used in almost every 
human activity, and inevitably eventually become regarded as waste. Most, if 
not all hazardous waste legislation expressly excludes not only domestic and 
other non-industrial wastes which may contain hazardous' chemicals-it also 
specifically exempts small waste generators (typically <10 te per year) and 
many other wastes such as oil drilling sludges, various refining slags and min- 
ing tailings, etc. Even so, with the framework so whittled down that some esti- 
mate it  to legally exclude more than 65% of all hazardous wastes, the U.S. RCRA. 
for example, is still supposed to regulate the activities of some 270,000 separate 
waste generators [15]. involving thousands of widely different chemicals in 
different consignments and unknown mixtures, and approximately 50,000 waste 
transporters performing an- estimated 200,000 million ton-miles per year of 
waste haulage in about 1.5 million vehicles 1211. The regulated actors range 
from international giants such as DuPont, to tiny family businesses with one 
operation. The movements, transfers, mixing, storage and treatmen t of those 
wastes is all performed by countless uncoordinated decisions and arrangements 
operating under normal decentralized market principles. Even the treatment 
and disposal industry in the U.S., let alone waste generators and transporters, 
involves an estimated 25,000 facilities of many different types. There are also 
many new industries emerging rapidly in areas like microelectronics and 
biotechnology which are small but numerous, and use sma!l quantities of highly 
toxic materials. It indicates the  extreme differentiation of the field to note that 
one hazardous waste treatment and disposal company, Safety Kleen, which grew 
to be a major enterprise, began as a solvent collector from small dry cleaning 
firms with an average pick-up of 7 gallons [22]. This also indicates why fre- 
quently a key expertise in the hazardous waste T and D field has been in tran- 
sport and collection systems. A similar portrait of extreme heterogeneity, 
albeit on a correspondingly smaller scale, can be painted for other countries. I t  
is not only a mat ter  of sheer numbers and diversity of activities and materials 
being handled. When there are countless industries creating chemical wastes 
with less than 100 employees. yet 30% of all chemicals sales (in market 
economies) are achieved by only 25 giant companies, differential size is also a 
significant mat ter  for regulatory strategies. 
Thus both hazardous wastes themselves, and their generating industries. 
are extremely dispersed, heterogeneous and ill-defined. All this offers a strik- 
ing contrast to the structure of the nuclear waste problem with which chernical 
waste is often compared. Nuclear wastes involve a very narrow range of well- 
known radionuclides in relatively narrow bands of composition. Furthermore, 
they arise in a very lirniteg number of well-known sites, are transported ir! a 
small number of consignments to very few treatment or storage facilities. It is 
easy to keep tabs on the arisings and movements, and those arisings are in 
chemical and hazard terms rather uniform, and easily supervised. Further- 
more, the industry itself, even where there are a few dozen utilities, as in the 
U.S., is rather  monolithic, with few centers of decision, control and responsibil- 
ity 1231. 
Thus, whereas nuclear waste or spent fuel regulators a t  least h o w  what is 
produced and moving where, chemicai waste regulators are very far from this 
position. In important respects the  regulatory problem for chemical wastes is 
more akin to nuclear proliferation safeguards regulation than nuclear wastes, 
since there  is a strong element of the detection and control of unknown, 
perhaps deliberately clandestine activity. This problem of heterogeneity, and 
regulatory ignorance of basic elements of what they are supposed to regulate, 
is highlighted by the indications that contaminated groundwater problems are 
arising from the rapid growth of microelectronics led by the mushrooming of 
many small firms. These discard small volumes of new, highly toxic chemicals. 
for example as surface cleaning or etching agents, but are too small to carry 
in-house chemical expertise for recycle or proper treatment; and they produce 
batches of waste possibly too small and variable to be worth another agent col- 
lecting them for recycle [24]. 
The question of industrial structure is central because without knowledge 
of this it is difficult to evaluate the belief that exemptions for small generators, 
exclude a vast number of generators but a tiny proportion of wastes from the 
regulatory system. OECD and EPA data 1251 suggest that this is strongly the 
case, but other policymakers have indicated that the countless unknown small 
generators are the greater source of regulatory anxiety. In this regard it may 
also be relevant that some countries or states, such as Denmark and Bavaria, 
are making strenuous efforts to establish effective regulated collection and 
treatment even of domestic hazardous wastes, which begin a t  each household 
as small volumes of highly toxic materials but end up on municipal sites in 
large volumes. In Britain i t  is now estimated that  the worst cases of soil pollu- 
tion of mercury and cadmium (amongst other things) come from domestic 
waste sites, not from industrial wastes 1261. I t  is necessary to remember that 
the reassurance of small volumes per s e  in aggregated figures may be beside 
the point if legally uncontrolled small volumes of highly toxic waste are locally 
concentrated in human exposures. 
A question raised by the  extreme heterogeneity of the field is whether 
there is, in fact, a unitary regulatory field anyway. Can standardised regulatory 
approaches based on tha t  assumption realistically tackle the issue? For exam- 
ple, small firms by definition tend t o  have less control over their economic and 
social environment, and are  likely t o  be less concerned with calculations of 
long t e r m  pay off or  side effects of present decisions. They will have a short- 
t e r m  time horizon for decision making. Large companies, on the other  hand, 
more secure, with grea ter  forward commitments a t  risk, and more control over 
the i r  immediate environment, perhaps a national image and international 
t rade to  nur ture  and protect,  are  likely to  have a longer term decision making 
horizon. These cultural aspects of decision making, and various specific organi- 
zational matters ,  such as  how internal accounting and responsibilities a re  allo- 
cated, how rapid turnover is, etc., will affect hazardous waste at t i tudes and 
practices in companies as much as  they will affect other areas. As a general 
point, small firms will t end  t o  have a different atti tude towards regulation than 
large firms which may have had direct influence on the  regulations anyway. 
Whether there is a unitary regulatory field is always an implicit problem as 
regulatory bureaucracies responsible for a large area of policy like environ- 
menta l  policy tend towards fragmentation into necessary specialist com- 
p e t e n c e ~  and approaches dictated partly by the innate characteristics of a 
given issue. Pollak has  described th is  and underlying processes whereby 
administrative segments have to gain expertise and credibility with separate.  
outside. regulated constituencies [27]. In hazardous waste these same tenden- 
cies appear to  be more extreme than  in other  areas! because there a re  so many 
different industrial sectors and processes to  be regulated and each one has  its 
own characteristics relevant to  the  evaluation of effects of different regulatory 
options and tactics. These tendencies towards fragmentation are exacerbated 
both by a structural need for more positive interference with the industries 
being regulated (discussed below) and the historical origins of hazardous waste 
regulatory attempts in fragmented local institutions. 
2. Professionalism 
The contrast with nuclear waste throws into relief another significant 
aspect of the chemical waste issue, namely the historical lack of professional- 
ism in the  field, which strongly affects the social structure and potential 
effectiveness of different regulatory strategies and arrangements. In the 
nuclear case, whether we are talking about radiation protection or engineering 
safety of nuclear plants, there has always been, from the outset of the industry, 
a well-developed professional cadre of experts, highly funded and with a strong 
basis in fundamental research as well as more applied analysis. As Senver has 
shown in the case of radiation protection [28], these cadres evolved early on, a 
strong sense of professional self-regulation, akin to normal scientific fields even 
where this regulation was extending into industrial areas. This affected stan- 
dards of vigilance. expertise, and quality control which helped to maintain pub- 
lic credibility and acceptable regulatory standards, even when the "regulatory" 
experts were formally part of the industry. Ensuing institutional structures of 
regulation were a t  least well-developed and financed, highly professionalized, 
with a strong ethos of enlightened self-interest (self-protection via preemption 
nf public hostility Sv protecting public health). Furthermore, there  was a con- 
tinuous bridge--even an iden tity-between the government regulators and the 
regulated industry. The regulators were recruited from the industry, and 
shared a common professional background and identity, somewhat aloof from 
either government or industry context. This arrangement  has drawbacks, but 
also important benefits. There is no doubt tha t  this "self-regulation" was far 
better than no regulation a t  all, which was the case for a long time with hazar- 
dous waste. 
Similar kinds of regulatory arrangements have developed in other fields. 
There is a significant connection with the heterogeneity factor, because i t  is 
the relatively unitary na ture  of t he  nuclear industry as a risk generating 
activity which has allowed i ts  regulatory cadres t o  be drawn from relatively uni- 
tary technical disciplines (radiation biology and physics; nuclear engineering) 
and so enhance a strong and somewhat aloof and neutral  professional identity. 
Typical recrui tment  to hazardous waste regulatory positions appears to vary 
widely. In Britain the government regulatory body is proud of t he  large indus- 
trial man-years experience of i ts  staff. In others i t  seems to be mainly 
engineers, or ecologists, or chemists,  with no industrial experience [29]. The 
hazards of nuclear processes and materials focus only upon radiation damage. 
This in itself involves an  extensive differentiation of specialist topics within the 
field. but i t  is nevertheless, under  a singular professional discipline, whose rela- 
tive social coherence has mean t  tha t  many questions about uncertainties and 
alternative techniques of analysis, etc. could be retained largely within the spe- 
cialist community, away from t h e  public regulatory agenda. In the case of 
hazardous wastes, with a more  fragmentary array of technical issues and 
relevant specialties (even within toxicology alone) this has  been more difficult. 
Because of this lack of a coherent  social containment insulating the  public 
regulatory arena from esoteric specialist concerns, many technical uncertain- 
ties have been more easily drawn into the  public policy/regulatory domain, 
leading to the greater confusion of standards-setting and implementation. 
Biotechnology provides an interesting comparison because the emergence 
of regulation bears some hallmarks of the development of professional self- 
regulation of radiologists in the 1920's and 1930's (the precursor of radiation 
protection around the nuclear industry), and its institutionalization in govern- 
men t regulatory arrangements .  Thus molecular biologists effectively them- 
selves alerted public concern t o  the risk associated with their  work in the 
famous Asilomar declaration of 1974 [30]. Although there was later  a lot of 
regret  and re t rea t  from this  position, the government National Institutes of 
Health committee se t  up t o  "regulate" activities in this field was not  only not an 
executive agency, but  was staffed by largely the  same corpus of experts who had 
first expressed t h e  need for systematic risk assessment and regulation. Thus 
the  same kind of bridging highly expert cadre s tructured regulatory develop 
rnents here a s  in the  nuclear  case. Now,  interestingly, the field which started 
with scientists organizing self-regulation has  industrialized very rapidly under 
essentially the same regulatory arrangements,  and in a diffuse decentralized 
way very different from t h e  nuclear  case, so tha t  this a rea  of regulation bears 
some characteristics of both the  nuclear and (in i ts  industrial s t ructure)  the 
chemical waste regulation cases. 
The central feature of hazardous chemical wastes is tha t ,  especially in 
government and most  of industry (though not i n  some larger chemical com- 
panies), i t  emerged from and  was thus  shaped by the ethos of ordinary waste 
arrangements and perceptions. There was no professional s ta tus  at tached to 
dealing with garbage, m d  no systematic attention or resources given to dea!ing 
with them. Thus, for example, many hazardous waste arrangements  and regu- 
latory personnel, in  governments and in industries, were of relatively low 
qualification and status,  with no cohering sense of professional identity or 
reputation t o  defend, with sound standards. They were usually organized, if at 
all, only at  diffuse and uncoordinated local plant and municipality levels. One 
of the  repeated comments about the early days of the EPA Office of Solid Waste's 
dealing with RCRA for example, was of their lack of qualification for dealing 
with the complex problems of risk management and regulation which swept 
through and transformed their established more mundane concerns about ordi- 
nary garbage [31]. Whereas the source of regulatory recruitment in the 
nuclear and biotechnology fields has been clear-cut and highly trained, recruit- 
ment to regulatory bodies for hazardous waste management seems to have 
been far more disparate and fragmentary*, with corresponding difficulties in 
establishing an effective professional identity bridging regulators and all 
reaches of the industry out to its smallest most esoteric corners. 
This history of low status, institutional and technical fragmentation, lack 
of technical expertise and professionalism, and neglect of hazardous waste 
combined with the extreme heterogeneity of the area has meant a very 
different institutional structure of regulation. Although there has existed the 
requisite professional expertise, resources and awareness for self-regulation in 
the specialist chemical companies, and despite attempts by trade associations 
to increase the levels of professionalism, the ethos and implementation of 
hazardous waste regulation is deeply influenced by this very different history of 
institutional development. The most important structural consequences are: 
(i) extremely uneven levels of technical competence in both industry and 
local governments, where most of the burden lies, of understanding 
and transforming regulations into effective action; 
*A senior regulator in the U.K., for example, could think of less than twelve peo?le in the 
whole country who would be qualified for the post of Chef inspector in the recently created 
Hazardous Wastes Inspectorate. There are no degrees or Chairs in Waste Management. 
(ii) alienation between regulators and regulated, who may have widely 
different backgrounds and perceptions of issues and how they should 
be dealt with; 
(iii) institutional complications brought about by the origins of regulatory 
activity and responsibility a t  low status,  non-expert local authority 
level, followed by rapid adoption of the issue by central authorities 
due to  political crisis in some countries, followed by redistribution, for 
practical reasons, of responsibility to the same local authorities, but 
under  transformed circumstances including far heavier technical and 
political demands than previously; 
(iv) therefore social structural difficulties in trying to  establish collabora- 
tive regulatory cultures which are  nevertheless open and accountable 
to third parties such as trades unions or  other  public interest groups. 
3. Hazardous Waste is P a c k a g e d Waste 
A defining characteristic of hazardous waste is t ha t  i t  is e i ther  solid, semi- 
solid, or, if liquid, packaged. I t  is concentrated, and needs handling and treat- 
m e n t  before eventual dispersal, destruction or  containment.  The immediate 
sense of t h e  significance of this is given i n  Figure 1. 
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In order to  give a sense of the  contrasts between hazardous waste and con- 
ventional environmental regulation, we can outline the possible stages in the  
life-cycle of any single 'packaged' waste: 
1. In-plant process-generation 
2. Mixing with other in-plant process s t reams 
3. factory-gate "arisings," packaged into transport consignments 
4. Collection and transport 
5. "Interim" storage (notorious as  defacto deposition sites) 
6. Mixing, repackaging, reloading 
7 .  Treatment and transformation (deliberate or inadvertent) - new by- 
product wastes 
8. Further  collection and transport 
B .  "Final" t reatment  or preparation for disposal (e.g., for incineration or 
landfill) 
10. 'Tinal" disposal - abandonment; monitored but  irretrievable deposi- 
tion; retrievable deposition (e.g., ex salt-mine). 
Through these stages a single waste may also change several times, not only in 
composition, form and value, but  also in ownership or  control; and i t  may thus  
have i ts  defined nature and s ta tus  change as  i t  moves from one agent t o  
another,  especially between different regulatory systems. 
When combined with the aspects of heterogeneity and diffuseness already 
outlined, this complex institzltional life-cycle has several important conse- 
quences, especially relating to  the  interaction of technical and institutional 
factors: 
Conventional environmental regulation such as air quality has dealt with 
disperson of potentially hazardous materials into the relevant medium direct 
from the source plant. Assessment has thus been to do with relevant natu~al 
transport and transformation mechanisms back into damage to people or 
significant media, and control has been usually via specifying ambient environ- 
mental standards which industry has to meet  by its own means. But hazardous 
waste is packaged, in consignments defined by the waste generator, is passed on 
to  transport operators who may mix i t  with other wastes for convenient and 
economic transport, and pass it on to other transport, storage or new transport 
means, etc.; and so on, until final disposal, destruction, containment and 
dispersal eventually occur. These final dispositions, incineration, landfill, or 
whatever, even if licensed and controlled, still involve conventional environ- 
mental dispersal (e.g. flue gases from incineration) and possible natural recon- 
centration (e.g. in ground water from landfill leaching). All the associated 
uncertainties of natural mechanisms are therefore still involved. 
However, the important e z h a  dimension of uncertainty for hazardous 
waste is the complex behavioral dimensior, between source plant and final 
disposition. It is, for example, because i t  is not dispersed, but packaged and 
therefore retrievable, tha t  the ambiguity as to whether hazardous waste is a 
waste or a (recyclable) resource is still open. and a major loophole in regula- 
tion. This cannot possibly be defined by central authorities because i t  i s  a Legi- 
timate and necessary factor of enterprise, innovation, and thus trade between 
industrial actors. Tbus autonomous industrial actors in their own unfathom- 
ably diverse economic, technical and social situations, not regulators, have to 
be given some latitude to define a "waste" as a "good" from their point of view, 
even if this self-controlled definition automatically exempts their material 
from regulation. This intrinsic ambiguity is analyzed further  in Chapter two. 
Even if the  more direct form of behavioral regulation in this area does not 
create  damaging unanticipated effects upon patterns of enterprise,  i t  inevitably 
implies more conflict between industry and regulator, because being packaged, 
the  waste being transformed and transferred is in principle, a t  least, more 
traceable to i t s  source. If i t  is found t o  be in the  wrong hands or  wrong place a t  
the  wrong time, the original waste producer is liable even if h e  has acted in 
good faith but been let  down by an  incompetent or  illegal operator down the  
chain of transfer. Unlike, say, 10' anonymous molecules of sulfuric acid found 
t o  be acidifying a Scandinavian lake, a container of acid residues with Punters 
Chemicals Ltd. printed on i t  being carelessly stored when i t  is supposed to have 
been neutralized and carefully disposed of, will ge t  Punters  into trouble. 
Specific cases like this have been experienced. and have caused sharp reaction 
[321. 
The fact of packaging creates  a continuity of potential specific traceable 
responsibility across a s o c h l  network not just a physical system, and  thus 
creates  strong pressure t o  positively control specific behavior within tha t  net- 
work as  well a s  the  emission levels a t  final disposal points as  in normal environ- 
mental  legislation. The issue of the dioxin contaminated wastes from Seveso 
can be interpreted in this perspective [33]. 
The potential ability of t he  regulator to scrutinize and control the  discrete, 
identifiable extensions (i.e. packaged wastes) of industrial processes thus 
implies more intzrferenze with industrial production itself. If every consign- 
m e n t  is supposed to be declared and  i ts  contents described. monitoring here  
involves testing these descriptions and declarations against direct analysis and 
the re  is not only more direct attribution of responsibility than with much of 
ambient environmental monitoring, but there is perhaps less room for inter- 
preting false declarations as honest mistakes. Therefore, an  element  of 
prosecutional tension and suspicion may pervade the regulatory situation, in 
the very area  where arguably, voluntary compliance and t rus t  are  intrinsically 
most needed to  have a viable system. 
In any case, the  fact t ha t  hazardous waste is packaged in principle provides 
the  regulator with more direct information about industrial activities which the  
industry may not  wish to  fully display. Paradoxically the  regulator needs more 
information in order to be in a position to obta in  tha t  information. Because the  
waste is packaged t h e  regulator needs more howledge  in a new domain, 
namely about t he  whole behavioral field of what is produced, where, in what 
volumes and mixes, where does it go and how is it treated. As analyzed in 
Chapter two, this  creates  a new kind of strategic conflict over regulatory infor- 
mation. which is fundamentally different from tha t  over "natural" facts. 
An extra  twist t o  t h e  existence of a complex institutional dimension in t h e  
movement of packaged waste is in the cross-border nature of many hazardous 
waste flows. The conventional cross-border pollution issues all involve diffuse, 
mainly atmospheric, natural  processes. There is t hus  relatively uniform depo- 
sition of pollutants over very large areas, via natural processes. The issue has 
been gradually rising t o  policy s tatus for some time, and whilst i ts  public recog- 
nition may have been triggered by specific local observations, i t s  general 
growth as  a n  issue has  been evident for several years. 
Hazcrdous waste is different in that being concentrated and transported by 
human agents, t he  local intensity and wider political reverbertions of specific 
incidents of lack of control may be much more volatile, as  i t  was for t he  Seveso 
barrels, or t h e  Belgian banning of Dutch wastes in 1983. Furthermore, the  
perception of the severity of such events may be multiplied by the  fact tha t  
they are  dzrectly under human responsibility, hence perhaps more threatening, 
whereas e.g. sulfur deposition is indirect, in tha t  t he  source coal plant operator 
did not actually direct its emitted sulfur to  a given deposition point, (even if 
the transport connection were actually known). Thus the  political/regulatory 
impact of one incident in the  case of hazardous waste, especially'if i t  is a 
transborder incident, is likely t o  be more severe and  unpredictable than in con- 
ventional transborder pollution. Furthermore, sanctions a re  more concrete. 
Transborder traffic in air pollution is difficult to  stop by the  importing nation, 
but  far less so for trucks or  freight cars importing hazardous waste. As a policy 
issue therefore, t he  amplitudes of unpredictability of hazardous waste a re  
likely to be greater  t han  those of otherwise parallel issues. 
A far greater  volume of toxic material passes across borders in human 
hands, by design, in the form of traded goods, raw materials,  and wastes, than 
by natural processes. Toxic goods transfers have been subject to  well organized 
attempts a t  coordinated regulation, but  toxic wastes have been less well regu- 
lated [34]. Not being part of consumer products (as  a r e  many toxic chemical 
goods), they are  likely t o  be more prone to  neglect, and sudden fluctuations of 
political mood amid demands or  real moves to  close frontiers to  hazardous 
wastes. This instability may invite paralysis of cross-border hazardous waste 
transfers, economic disruption and environmental mismanagement unless 
bet ter  understood. 
4. lnverse Materials -Cash Exchange Relations 
In order t o  define some important differences, i t  is useful t o  s ta r t  by view- 
ing hazardous waste T & D as just any other complex industry, regulated by 
conventional operating emission standards to air, water, and soil. The industry 
has resources inputs - other industries' wastes - for whose industrial 'conver- 
sion' i t  makes (or hopes to make) a profit. The only difference - and it  is cru- 
cial - is that  its resources inputs are of negative value. The T & D industry 
does not pay for its "resources'; i t  is paid specifically for taking them away and 
dealing with them and i t  is paid before it  converts its 'resources' into final 'pro- 
ducts.' This means that  the T & D industry receives the money as well as the 
inputs, yet - unlike a conventional industry which pays for its inputs - i t  is 
only really concerned to  receive the former. The relationships are represented 
in Figure 2. 
WASIT GOODS (as raw materials) 
GENERATOR 
( C u ~ ~ ~ l u a n  1 
CASH MATERIAL 
GENERATOR 
MATERIAL CASH 
Recoverablt 1 1 C c -  materials? + Yes 
T & D OPERATOR USER 
(CONTRACTOR) (CUSTOMER) 
HGURE 2 Materials-cash exchange relationships: hazardous waste and conventional 
materials. For waste, (a) the cash buys a service, not mate7irrls and ( b )  the service is 
invidble to its buyer. (I am grateful to E. ffinecy for the original point from which this 
is developed) 
The regulatory situation. is fundamentally affected by this structural pro- 
perty. Four points arise from this: 
(a) for waste, the cash buys a service,  not materials; 
(b) the service is invisible to its buyer, who therefore does not h o w  if i t  
has been fully performed. Therefore the servicer (T & D operator), 
who has already been paid, h a s  no incentive to  carry out the  service 
(i.e.. receive the hazardous waste, or t rea t  them properly once 
received) because this costs t he  servicer; 
(c) because of t he  lack,of value in the  waste from the generator's point of 
view, i t  is not  subject to any kind of "quality control"; thus  i ts  chemi- 
cal composition, mixing and even physical form may vary more  or less 
uncontrollably. Yet this radically affects the feasibility of t rea tment ,  
in which somebody has to  invest resources. Such uncontrolled varia- 
tion is a major problem for T & D operation and thus a key obstacle to 
more investment in T & D: 
(d) for wastes containing valuable resources tha t  could be extracted, t he  
same variability problem arises. But in principle there may come a 
point where the  value of extractable materials makes the  "waste" 
worth paying for by the  T & D industry ra ther  than being paid to  take 
i t  away. However this not only makes more incentive for quality con- 
trol ("no quality, no pay" clauses), i t  also converts the "waste" into 
"not-waste," and thus automatically exempts i t  from hazardous waste 
regulation in most systems. This is a major loophole because there  
a re  so  many wastes, and the  transition for each one is open t o  diverse 
and fluctuating definition way beyond the  single perspective a n d  con- 
trol of a regulatory body. 
5. Ignorance ma Under-Ripeness for Risk Yauagement 
As indicated before, the hazardous waste problem is in important respects  
underripe for systematic risk management approaches because t h e  a rea  is 
characterized by ignorance of basic, elementary properties and parameters 
more than definable uncertainties in known damage generating processes and 
substances. Thus, for example, although he felt it to be a flawed Act, the Dutch 
Secretary of State for Environment in 1979, L. Ginjaar, decided to go ahead with 
the Chemical Waste Act because there were at  least registration requirements 
which would eventually produce information, a t  the time initially completely 
lacking, about the  volumes and compositions of the large variety of wastes pro- 
duced by industry [35]. In his view, only when this was compiled and,analyzed 
could a better Act be designed and proper research carried out to define risks 
and help choose better regulatory instruments and standards. Perhaps indicat- 
ing the extent and intractability of this ignorance, although Ginjaar thought 
such revisions could be made in three years, these are not in sight after 5 years 
of implementation. 
The concrete objective of. hazardous waste regulation is to differentiate 
wastes into streams, which can be channelled towards different kinds of treat- 
ment and disposal appropriate to each class of waste. 'Despite the scientific 
uncertainties in the environmental behavior and health effects of different 
chemicals and mixes, this form of regulation implies an adequate degree of 
knowledge about health risks (perhaps built upon supposedly wide margins for 
error by assumptions e.g. about containment). I t  focuses instead upon the 
effective organization of this industrial and trading activity into the appropri- 
ate treatment and disposal option. It is, therefore, as noted, inevitably more 
directive than conventional environmental regulation. Thus, for example, regu- 
lations may specify not only that PCB's must be incinerated, but they may 
further specify how they must be collected, how they may or may not be mixed, 
and under what conditions of design and operation their incineration must take 
place. The same kind of constraints may be exercised for a very long list of 
scheduled chemicals or waste streams. 
Such regulation of the T & D industry is part of the waste management sys- 
tem for hazardous waste, but does not exist for conventional emissions. The 
dilemma is that public attention requires formal risk management frameworks; 
this requires detailed regulation; but this stifles an embryonic T & D industry 
which is simultaneously part of the problem and part of the solution. 
The heterogeneity factor also enters in here. The kind of regulation 
described above is inevitably highly interventionist, which is a major reason for 
the difficulties experienced in implementation. But i t  is intervention in a wide 
variety of different industries, plants, processes, and conditions. It implies a 
need for a very wide range of specific expertises. Not surprisingly, compared to 
the experts in any given industry, the experts in a regulatory body will be non- 
experts, and conflict is highly likely, not just on specific points but more corro- 
sively, over competence and credibility in general. 
Compare this situation with the nuclear case again. Here there is usually 
only one central decision making frame*, and the institutional structure of 
regulation outlined before means that  the regulators are an integrated part of 
the industrial design, planning and decision making process anyway. Nuclear 
plant design, for example, is carried out in detailed consultation with regula- 
tory experts to assess design features of requisite safety standards. Waste pro- 
cessing and transport are likewise designed and conducted with regulators part 
cf the  decision making process. The dividing line between regulation and indus- 
trial planning is nearly broken down altogether. Thus the "interference" of 
Private initiatives in U.S. nuclear waste processing have virtually collapsed. 
regulators due to the fact that nuclear waste is also packaged, is a non-issue 
because they are already integrated in decision making anyway, and in a state 
run monopoly industry there is not the same cutting edge of competition and 
ever-vulnerable profit margins to keep regulators and their impact as distant as 
possible. 
Another side-effect of the same structural property is that ,  because the 
nuclear industry is essentially only one industry, there is no real ambiguity as 
t o  the "wastes-resources" boundary. There is, of course, one such conflict 
cleaving the whole area, namely the proper role of plutonium created in and 
extracted from spent thermal reactor fuels, and there are  others, such as the 
role of otherwise useless natural uranium as breeder fuel if that  option is 
chosen. However, the point is that these are conflicting options and definitions 
dealt with by whole policy systems, and uniformly applied without ambiguity 
within a given system once decided. Unlike hazardous chemicals, they are not 
subject to  regular definition and dynamic choice by a polycentric interacting 
network of autonomous enterprises with diverse interests and perceptions. 
Thus one major source of intrinsic confusion and limitation to effective imple- 
mentation in hazardous waste regulation is essentially absent from the nuclear 
case. 
Conclusions 
These observations of the underripeness of hazardous waste policy for risk 
assessmert may be st luctura l !y  valid, but that fact is that  public reactions and 
pessure is  creating an inevitable demand for the issue to  be defined more ela- 
borately and formally in terms of risk assessment. Whether this will be an exer- 
cise in public reassurance or a genuine decision aid remains to be determined. 
The keys to this will be: 
(i) The way in which regulatory bodies treat intrinsic ignorance .and 
uncertainty which, in this field, encompass any attempt to formulate a 
risk management approach. 
(ii) The responses of policy to the conflict between the need to create and 
maintain a new industry as part of regulation, and the increasing need 
to subject i t  to formal regulatory controls before its e z i s t e n c e  is even 
secured. Thus the risk management dimensions interconnect with 
basic institutional questions of industrial investment, public financing 
and management, etc. 
The next two chapters review different existing approaches to formal risk 
analysis and analyze their relevance to the hazardous waste problem area, 
before going on in Chapter 4 to analyze the variable institutional roots of the 
apparently purely technical endeavour of hazard classification. 
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